Disinformation, a longstanding weapon in warfare, skilfully employs technological tools to deceive adversaries and secure strategic advantages. In today’s digital age, social media wields unprecedented power, overshadowing traditional media in access and technology, consequently fuelling the alarming surge in disinformation. The personalization of media content perpetuates echo chambers, stifling exposure to diverse perspectives. This insidious synergy between feedback loops and disinformation perpetuates a self-sustaining cycle, distancing us from the truth and cementing ideological divides. Social media users find themselves ensnared in this disinformation warfare, with evolving technology continually heightening the challenges we face.
Summary
Project Beta successfully developed a handheld tactical computer intended for use at the infantry platoon level. The project, however, was shelved subsequently. Project Beta's successful collaboration model—uniting research institutions, academia and private enterprises—offers a blueprint for strengthening Atmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector.
Project Beta was a unique effort in Indian defence innovation, marked by a collaboration between academia, industry and the Indian Army. Despite ambitious timelines and evolving requirements, Project Beta successfully developed SATHI (Situational Awareness Tactical Handheld Interface), a small palm-sized or handheld tactical computer intended for use at the infantry platoon level. Just as the world was witnessing the US Army's technological prowess, equipping soldiers with Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) for enhanced battlefield awareness during the Iraq War of 2003, the Indian Army embarked on testing its own ground-breaking handheld PDA, SATHI.
This ambitious project, sought to equip the Indian infantry with cutting-edge technology that was far ahead of its time. The project sought to combine several technologies such as
Geographical Information System, Global Positioning System and Wireless Networking, customized for use by Infantry troops deployed in Counter Insurgency Operations. The project is aimed at developing a single low-cost hardware platform to meet the Infantry requirements of navigation, map reading, radio communications and information management, so that situation awareness and command and control in close combat situations are immensely facilitated.1
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) pointed out that the project was the ‘first R&D project initiated by the Army with no precedence or parallel’.2 The MoD highlighted that maintenance of command and control was the most difficult part in successful execution of operations by the Infantry. The MoD noted that the SATHI device could help in reducing casualties in counter-insurgency tasks and enable cohesive operations.
Looking at it retrospectively, the SATHI device was far ahead of its time when it was conceived and delivered in 2005. SATHI packed a lot into an 875-gram rugged set that was smaller than a brick. The solar-powered PDA ran on a 128-bit encrypted system, a Linux program, and was capable of withstanding temperatures between -20°C and +70°C. It had a 5 km range, a GPS receiver, and a 24-hour battery life. It supported both voice and text communication for devices deployed in the mission area. Its software-controlled radio allowed regular updates of device positions, messages and map markings over the entire network, either directly or by relay.3
The password-protected device could even act as a decoy if it fell into enemy hands. If unauthorised attempts were made to log in, the unit could reveal the position of the person attempting the break-in to friendly troops. SATHI represented the mastery of technological change and leveraging existing technology and industry to our advantage. It delivered a state-of-the-art device comparable to the best in the world, showcasing the potential of Indian defence innovation.
The device was GPS-enabled, with built-in radio communication, pre-loaded GIS, and a wireless data network to provide soldiers with real-time location tracking, navigation and secure communication on the battlefield. With a 24-hour battery life, 120 initial devices were tested by the Rashtriya Rifles Sector in J&K, and the SATHI device provided a critical technical edge in the increasingly electronic battlefield scenario.
The SATHI device received high praise from top military officials and even the then Hon’ble President Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, with plans underway to expand its deployment and further refine its capabilities, which were approved by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO). An additional order for 1,300 devices was cleared by the DGMO.4 Despite initial success and promising results, Project Beta was terminated around 2007 in favour of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions. This decision, as highlighted by analysts such as Bharat Karnad, exemplified a recurring pattern in India's missed opportunities in efforts to achieve indigenous technological self-reliance.5
The cancellation of Project Beta, despite its initial success and potential for further development, highlights the challenges faced by indigenous defence innovation in India. It also underscores the missed opportunity to capitalise on a home-grown solution that was ahead of its time, and could have potentially transformed the capabilities of the Indian infantry. The closure of Project Beta, therefore, represented a significant opportunity cost, hindering India's potential to become a leader in military technology and innovation.
Project Beta and the Simputer
Project Beta originated in 2000 with the Late Prof. Roddam Narasimha's vision to empower the infantry through technology. Narasimha's proposal, inspired by the challenges faced by soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir, aimed to improve situational awareness, communication and decision-making on the battlefield. The project gained momentum with the emergence of the Simputer,6 a revolutionary handheld device designed for farmers, which garnered international recognition. The Simputer's affordability, user-friendly interface and advanced features made it an ideal foundation for a military-grade tactical device. By integrating GPS, wireless communication and battlefield mapping functionalities, the Simputer could be transformed into a powerful tool for soldiers on the front lines.
Project Beta was thus launched in 2003 with the ambition of bridging the gap between India's IT prowess and its military capabilities down to the platoon level. It aimed to leverage existing technologies and the expertise of academia and industry to deliver a cost-effective and customised solution for the Indian infantry. The project's success would not only enhance the Army's operational effectiveness but also serve as a testament to India's growing prowess in defence technology innovation. Project Beta thus became a significant initiative by the MoD focused on adapting the Simputer, a low-cost revolutionary handheld device, for military use at the platoon level.
A high-level steering committee, chaired by the Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri (SA to RM) and comprised of leaders from diverse sectors such as the Chairman of Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Director of the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR), the Deputy Chief of Indian Army and Army HQ Tactical Command and Communication and Intelligence (TacC3I) Directorate, was established to oversee this important project.7 The involvement of these organisations highlighted a comprehensive collaboration between the government, academia and the private sector to harness technology for national defence.
The Indian Army's funding of Project Beta underscored the military's recognition of the Simputer's potential to transform battlefield technology. This comprehensive approach, involving collaboration between the military, industry and academia, aimed to transform the Simputer into a powerful tool for the Indian Army, highlighting the country's commitment to technological innovation in defence. Lt Gen S.S. Mehta, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, who was the Beta Executive Committee (BEC) Chair, played a pivotal role in identifying the Simputer's military applications and championing its customisation to cater to the specific needs of the infantry. This proactive approach, coupled with the emphasis on leveraging India's IT industry and defining military requirements, demonstrated the country's commitment to innovation and self-reliance in defence technology.
The BEC comprised representatives from various sectors, including the National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS), Defence Finance, ADG Information Systems, CAIR (representing DRDO), PicoPeta and Encore Software. Day-to-day operations were managed by the Beta Project Management Team (BPMT), a dedicated group of officers with field experience, including Col K.P.M. Das (Signals) (who headed the project), Lt Col P.R. Menon (Signals), Maj Amitabh Roy, VrC, SM, and Bar of Garhwal Rifles, and Maj S.S. Wirk of JaK Light Infantry (LI).
The project's success can be attributed to the close collaboration between the BPMT and the manufacturers, Encore Software, in Bangalore. This unique user–manufacturer coordination, unusual for such projects, allowed for efficient problem-solving and rapid development, resulting in the project's completion within a short span of 18 months. The close relationship between the project team, which included officers with battle experience and accomplished signal officers from the Indian Army, and the manufacturers fostered a highly productive environment that contributed to the project's overall success.
Recent Initiatives and Atmanirbhar Bharat
Project Beta serves as a cautionary tale, underscoring the importance of nurturing indigenous innovation, investing in long-term research and development, and fostering a robust ecosystem for technological advancement. It highlights the need to learn from past mistakes and avoid over-reliance on external solutions. It also offers valuable lessons for the Indian Army's recent steps towards Atmanirbharta. Recent initiatives by the Indian Army, such as the ‘Make in India’ programme, defence industrial corridors, and collaborations with DRDO and academia, demonstrate a renewed commitment to Atmanirbharta. These efforts, coupled with a changing mind set among military leaders, offer hope for a future where indigenous innovation is not only embraced but actively championed.
For Atmanirbhar Bharat to succeed, India must invest in cultivating domestic talent and capabilities through robust research and development programmes, incentivising domestic manufacturing, and establishing a resilient defence industrial base. This endeavour necessitates a sustained, long-term vision and unwavering commitment to indigenous innovation, with consistent leadership support and adequate funding.
Creating a thriving ecosystem for innovation is paramount. This entails fostering collaboration, mentorship and resource-sharing initiatives, such as iDEX, defence innovation hubs and academic partnerships. It is also imperative to learn from past failures of implementation, like Project Beta, by incorporating mechanisms for analysing mistakes and identifying areas for improvement into Atmanirbhar Bharat plans. Reducing reliance on foreign solutions, which contributed to the decision to terminate Project Beta, is essential for achieving national security and technological self-reliance under Atmanirbhar Bharat.
Project Beta's successful collaboration model—uniting research institutions, academia and private enterprises—offers a blueprint for strengthening Atmanirbhar Bharat in the defence sector. India should harness the combined expertise and resources of diverse stakeholders to enhance indigenous capabilities, accelerate defence technology development and reduce reliance on foreign suppliers, stimulate economic growth, and foster technology transfer and skill development within the country.
India needs to adopt a more holistic and long-term approach to defence technology development. The following need to be the essential elements that encompass defence technology development.
- Stable Funding: Ensuring stable and predictable funding for critical projects is crucial to prevent disruptions and compromises.
- Clear Priorities: Defining clear priorities and aligning them with national security goals will help avoid unnecessary shifts in focus. There should be no mid-course cancellation of projects unless due to sinking costs.
- Support for Domestic Innovation: Encouraging and supporting domestic research and development is essential for building a self-reliant defence industrial base.
- Streamlined Decision-Making: Efforts should be made to streamline the decision-making process and reduce bureaucratic hurdles to ensure timely project implementation.
- International Collaboration: Strategic international collaborations can provide access to technology and expertise that may not be readily available domestically.
India can bolster its defence capabilities and achieve self-reliance in critical technologies, ultimately enhancing national security, by strategically leveraging global expertise while nurturing domestic innovation. Combining the expertise and resources of diverse stakeholders can streamline the innovation cycle, resulting in cost-effective solutions that leverage the strengths of each partner. Key areas that require such a collaborative approach include cyber security, space technology, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and robotics, materials science, 6G technology, quantum technologies, alternative fuels and dual-use technologies.
By learning from the past and building on these lessons, India can ensure that future defence innovations are not only developed but also successfully deployed and sustained, contributing to a stronger and more self-reliant nation. India's pursuit of Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence technology is a multi-faceted endeavour, requiring strategic vision, robust collaboration, sustained investment and a commitment to innovation.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
- 1. “Annual Report, 2004-05”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, pp. 36–37.
- 2. Ibid.
- 3. Sandeep Unnithan, “Why the Army’s Changed Mindset on Indigenous Technology is a Relief”, India Today, 21 October 2019.
- 4. Ibid.
- 5. Bharat Karnad, Why India Is Not A Great Power (Yet), New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 321–324.
- 6. The Simputer, a revolutionary handheld device, was designed by a team of scientists from the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) in Bangalore, led by Swami Manohar, V. Vinay and Shashank Garg. PicoPeta was responsible for the manufacturing and commercialisation of the Simputer. It garnered international acclaim, including being listed by Time Magazine and The New York Times in 2001 as a technology poised to change the world. Its ground-breaking features such as a touchscreen interface, handwriting recognition, and text-to-speech capabilities, were ahead of their time and are now considered standard in modern mobile devices.
- 7. The author served as the focal point for Project Beta from its inception till 2006 when he joined Ministry of Defence. The Army’s TacC3I Directorate was renamed as Directorate General Information Systems (DGIS) in May 2004. See “Annual Report, 2004-05”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, p. 35.
Over the last few years, Vietnam’s political environment has witnessed a major churn in the wake of the ongoing dot lo anti-corruption drive. Since 2016, Nguyen Phu Trong, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), has been taking measures to curb corruption as it was seen as essential to ensure the legitimacy of the party.
The campaign reached the highest-levels of the party-state apparatus when in January 2018, Dinh La Thang became the first member of the Party’s Politburo to be sentenced to prison. Minister of Information and Communication, Truong Minh Tuan was dismissed and Bui Van Thanh, a deputy minister in the Ministry of Public Security, along with Dinh Ngoc He, chairman of the military’s Thai Son Joint Stock Company, were arrested.
In 2024, many high-profile officials have been charged with fraud connected to the state-owned PetroVietnam Construction Joint Stock Corporation and Sacom, Ocean and Vietnam Construction banks. PetroVietnam’s chief executive officer was sentenced to death and fellow executive Trinh Xuan Thanh was sentenced to double life terms in prison.1
President Nguyen Xuan Phuc resigned in January 2023, in the wake of a series of corruption scandals involving his subordinates and their handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Phuc’s successor Vo Van Thuong who took oath in March 2023 also resigned in March 2024 over violating party rules which included fraud and bribery allegations.2 In 2024, there have been some major shakeups in Vietnam’s top leadership with the resignations of the third- and fourth-most senior officials in the government. This included National Assembly Chair Vuong Dinh Hue in April and President Vo Van Thuong in March. Further, on 16 May, Truong Thi Mai, head of the Central Organization Commission of the Communist Party of Vietnam and fifth-highest ranking official in the government, resigned from the Politburo.
On 20 May 2024, the National Assembly convened and elected its Vice-Speaker Tran Thanh Man to replace Vuong Dinh Hue as Chairman and To Lam, Minister of Public Security to succeed Vo Van Thuong as President. They now join General Secretary of the CPV Nguyen Phu Trong and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, as the traditional ‘four pillars’ of Vietnam’s leadership. While the post of the President is largely ceremonial, Lam as head of the state puts him in a very strong position to become the next CPV’s general secretary, which is the most important political position in the country. The CPV general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong is currently serving his third term and may not seek another term after 2026.3
The crackdown on big corruption cases and wrongdoings of high-ranking officials is seen as necessary towards restoring public trust and confidence. Public trust in the government has been on a decline especially after serious allegations of extortions amounting to US$ 200 million from expatriate Vietnamese who were trying to return home during the COVID-19 pandemic. Investigations were also launched against more than 100 people linked to a US$ 172 million scandal involving Viet A Technology Company.
These corruption scandals led to President Nguyen Xuan Phuc resigning in January 2023, which raised serious questions about the transparency of the government. The ongoing political discourse in Vietnam is geared towards creating a positive sentiment and addressing the dissatisfaction of the public. CPV general secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign has also contributed positively in terms of Vietnam's ranking in the international anti-corruption rankings. According to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2022, Vietnam ranked 77th out of 180 countries, which is its highest position since 2012.4
While Vietnam continues to be a one-party state under the political control of the CPV, economic liberalisation, its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2007 and signing a number of free trade agreements made it emerge as an attractive market for foreign direct investments. Vietnam achieved an impressive economic track record on account of strong fundamentals that included favourable demographics, skilled human capital and good income distribution.
The anti-corruption measures dominating Vietnam’s current political discourse are seen as necessary steps to ensure economic growth of 7–8 per cent to reach the current position of Asian economies such as Taiwan and South Korea by 2035.5 Measures such as deregulations and lowering the cost of doing business will attract more foreign direct investments in Vietnam as it continues to strive to become one of the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia, and achieve a middle-income status.6
President To Lam, who spent more than four decades in the Ministry of Public Security before becoming a minister in 2016 was behind many of the anti-corruption investigations against high-profile politicians and senior officials. The crackdown on corruption that has led to the resignation of two Presidents, senior officials, also included the biggest-ever fraud case by Truong My Lan, the chair of the developer Van Thinh. She was found guilty of embezzlement of US$ 12.5 billion, equivalent to almost 3 per cent of Vietnam’s GDP.7
These actions in the last few years which led to the resignation of senior officials and a number of high-profile financial scandals has also impacted Vietnam’s economy negatively. As per the World Economic Outlook published by the International Monetary Fund, Vietnam’s GDP is estimated to be around 5 per cent in 2024. It had made a good recovery post COVID-19 pandemic in 2021, registering a GDP growth of 8.1 per cent in 2022 but fell to 5 per cent in 2023.8
Therefore, the ongoing political clampdown which seeks to restore the integrity of the party, will have some negative economic impact in the short run. However, as Vietnam is on the way to become a middle-income nation, the anti-graft campaign is being undertaken to ensure good governance. This will help build institutions that can aid complex cooperative interactions between domestic and international partners, which is key for innovation and Vietnam’s future growth.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
- 1. “Vietnam’s Political Freedoms and its Economic Success”, East Asia Forum, 21January 2019.
- 2. Jonathan Head, “Vietnam: President Vo Van Thuong Resigns After a Year in Office”, BBC, 21 March 2024.
- 3. “Vietnam’s Top Security Official to Lam Confirmed as President”, The Hindu, 22 May 2024.
- 4. “Vietnamese Skeptical of Government’s Crackdown on Scandals”, VOA News, 3 March 2023.
- 5. Matthew Busch, “The Missing Middle: A Political Economy of Economic Restructuring in Vietnam”, Lowy Institute, 8December 2017.
- 6. Pankaj Jha, “Vietnam’s Anti-Corruption War”, Modern Diplomacy, 13 July 2022.
- 7. “Vietnam’s Billionaire Truong My Lan Sentenced to Death in USD 12.5 bn Fraud Case”, ANI, 11 April 2024.
- 8. “World Economic Outlook (April 2024)”, International Monetary Fund, April 2024.
Summary
The March 2024 terrorist attack by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Moscow Oblast brings to attention the Islamic State’s long-standing animosity towards the Russian state. The group also seeks to destabilise the relationship between Russia and Central Asia. Russia can be expected to deal with the ISKP threat more aggressively, including tighter border controls. The Islamic State Vilayat Caucasus, founded in 2015, also exists which operates in the historically conflict-prone Northern Caucasus region.
On 22 March 2024, a major terrorist attack took place in the Crocus City Hall, Krasnogorsk, in the Moscow Oblast, in which 137 people were killed and 180 were injured. This major terrorist attack on Russian soil occurred 20 years after the Beslan school tragedy, when 330 lives were lost in the attack executed by the Chechen secessionist forces. Four Tajiks militants were arrested and 12 people were detained in connection with the Moscow attack. There were many speculations over who was responsible for the attack. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), however, claimed responsibility for the attack.
The ISKP is a regional Islamic State chapter focusing on the South Asia and Eurasia regions, including Russia. ISKP has been known to accommodate Central Asian fighters from bordering Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. It has been known to commit attacks in Central Asia, including cross-border attacks into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. On 18 April 2022, for instance, it launched ten rockets into Uzbekistan from the Balkh province of Afghanistan and on 7 May 2022, seven rockets were launched into Tajikistan from the Khawaja Ghar district. Its focus is not limited to the Central Asian territories though, with the group being known to be critical of Russia and China, especially their involvement in Afghanistan.
Islamic State and Russia
The Islamic State is a Salafi Jihadist terror group that primarily operates in Syria and Iraq. Its primary objective is the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate globally. Since its inception, the Islamic State has kept Russia as one of the main targets.1 The terror group has inherited its animosity towards the Russians from its predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), whose founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a mujahedeen fighting in the Soviet–Afghan war.2 The AQI in the past has been responsible for the killing and abduction of Russian Embassy employees in Iraq in 2006.3
The Islamic State's anti-Russian stance is built into its foundational doctrine. The Islamic State leadership highlighted that Russia was one of its top enemies in 2014 during a speech by Abu Bakr-al Baghdadi, the first leader of the group.4 The group has also used its propaganda machinery to target the Russian state and create hatred among like-minded radicals towards Russia. Since its formation, the group has coined the term ‘Crusader East’ for Russia and established its own Russian media wing.5 Media outlets have been used to spread anti-Russian propaganda, including the one that claimed the responsibility for the recent Moscow attacks. The attack was also a culmination of years of anti-Russian propaganda espoused by the group and the ire building up within the radicalised anti-Russian individuals of the group.
After the recent attack, Al Azaim, the main propaganda magazine, published images stressing future attacks on Moscow, including statements such as “one battle, one enemy, from the south in Mozambique to the far north in Russia”.6 The group has even used the conflict in Ukraine for its propaganda, highlighting how the conflict is bogging down Russia and calling it a war between two sets of Crusaders.7
With the Russian preoccupation in Ukraine, the group feels it would be an appropriate time to strike against Russia, both territorially and its citizens abroad. With the rising propaganda against Russia, there has been a significant increase in the attacks on Russian nationals and buildings. One such example is the 5 September 2022 attack on the Russian Embassy in Kabul by the ISKP where two Russian nationals lost their lives after a terrorist detonated a bomb when a diplomat and his security guard came out.8 This attack happened after the Taliban takeover. Prior to the attack in Moscow in 2024, the Russian authorities reportedly thwarted an ISKP attack on the Russian Synagogue in the Kaluga region where they had planned to attack congregants.9 The terrorists were neutralised by the Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (FSB) when they put up resistance.
For Russia, the threat has not just been limited to the ISKP but also the Islamic State Vilayat Caucasus. The Vilayat Caucasus was founded in 2015 and operates in the historically conflict-prone Northern Caucasus region (Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Ingushetia). Since its inception, the organisation has waged a jihad against the Russian establishment, with most of the old warlords in the North Caucasus who were against the Russian state pledging allegiance to the Islamic State.10
Apart from individuals pledging allegiance to the group, there are also radicalised elements in the North Caucasus with secessionist tendencies who have been attracted by the idea of the Islamic State. This was visible when the Russian security agency, the FSB, on 28 March 2023 eliminated ISIS-affiliated terrorists in Karabulak, Ingushetia.11 Given the Islamic State’s offshoot in the Caucasus, the Vilayat Caucasus, Russia faces the IS threat within its borders.
The reports of two Chechen groups (Ajnad al Kavkaz, Sheikh Mansoor Battalion), both with ISIS links fighting on the Ukrainian side, have further stressed the ISIS focus on Russia. While they are fighting against Russia, the main purpose is not to support any regime but the long-term dismantling of the Russian state and support of secessionism in North Caucasus. These radical fighters are part of the secessionist groups who fought against the Russian regime in the former Chechen conflict from the 1990s till 2004.
With various Islamic State groups focused on Russia, the Islamic State has made Russia a long-term target and sees Moscow as a major threat to its objectives in the international arena. The Islamic State has drawn inferences from Russia’s past involvements, particularly in Syria. This also comes from Russia’s ability to counter terrorist activities within its own region, particularly in the North Caucasus.
Islamic State Motives
The Islamic State’s targeting of Russia is based on various factors, ranging from the historical conflicts and Russia’s involvement in Afghanistan, one of the hotbeds of Islamic State activities and the Central Asian connect of Russia.
One of the primary reasons for the Islamic State's focus on Russia is the terror group's idea of revenge for Russia’s historical mistreatment of Muslims. The group accused Russia of being a state that oppresses Muslims both at home and abroad12 by referring to Russia’s Northern Caucasus conflict and the Syria conflict. Islamic State stresses that it will take revenge for Russia’s campaigns in Afghanistan (Soviet era), the North Caucasus (namely Dagestan and Chechnya) and Syria. The group also tried to draw attention to similar radicalised elements by propagating that the Russians are a menace to Islam by citing the above three examples. Russia has always been part of the jihadist historical ideational thought process because of Afghanistan, the North Caucasus and Syria. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Islamic State would stress the importance of targeting Russia.
Another factor for the Islamic State has been the recently improved relationship of Russia with the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan. The Russians have been part of the peace process even before the Taliban came into power, and have developed a space for discussions with the Taliban. After the coming of the Taliban in 2021, Russia was one of the few countries which did not shut down its Embassy.
The Islamic State, particularly its South Asian outlet ISKP, has set its sights on the Taliban in the region. The ISKP is playing the role the Taliban was said to have played in the past, as a militant insurgent group against the state. The myriad differences, particularly the ideological differences between the Taliban and ISKP, act as the critical factors for driving a wedge between the two groups. One such difference is that the ISKP calls for the establishment of a global Caliphate whereas the Taliban is mostly concentrated in Afghanistan. Secondly, the Taliban is mostly Pashtun-dominated, whereas the ISKP draws from diverse cohorts of militant jihadists. Lastly, a major difference is that ISKP attracts even individuals from the Taliban who consider the Taliban as not extremist enough.
The ISKP has also stressed that the Taliban has focused on working with ‘Kafir’ governments, including Russia, to maintain its leadership in Kabul. The Taliban is known to have a limited relationship with Russia, given that Moscow still designates them as terror group. Russia was part of the peace process and is one of the few nations to not withdraw its embassy staff after the return of the Taliban. The Russians have also interacted with them in various forums such as the Russia–Islamic Kazan Forum, St Petersburg International Economic Forum, and Moscow Format Consultations. The two have also discussed joint projects, signed preliminary agreements in 2022 and have made attempts to cooperate in counter-terrorism. The Russians do, however, stress that it would still continue to not recognise the Taliban as the legitimate leaders of the Afghanistan republic unless the human rights situation is improved, and the regime stops its mistreatment of women and minorities.
It is this relationship that the ISKP has targeted through various propaganda outlets. The ISKP has tried to portray the Taliban regime as ‘puppets’ or ‘proxies’ of foreign nations, including Russia, and has used the images of Taliban representatives with Russian officials.13 The ISKP, through its propaganda machinery, has tried to mobilise more individuals, including some from the Taliban, and it uses Russia's cooperation with the Taliban as a reason for it.
Another objective of the Islamic State is to destabilise the relationship between Russia and Central Asia. To the Central Asian Republics, Russia is a significant provider of security from external aggression, including attack by non-state actors like terror groups. Central Asian nations, excluding Turkmenistan, are also part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its Regional Anti-Terror Structure (RATS) alongside Russia, and both platforms are meant to eradicate terrorism from the region. The group sees the Central Asian nations as puppets of the Russian leadership14 and feels that Russia could deter its quest to create the Khorasan province.
The Islamic State could take advantage of the rising anti-Russian sentiment present after the Russian mobilisation since 21 September 2022 which led many Russians migrating to Central Asia. About 700,000 people emigrated from Russia, out of whom approximately more than half of the Russians sought refuge in Central Asia.15 It can tap into the rising Russophobia and gain more manpower by radicalising more individuals to fight against Russia.
Given the Islamic State's use of Central Asian fighters, resentment and antagonism against Central Asian migrants among the domestic Russian population has increased. The Central Asian leadership have warned their citizens not to travel to Russia for work or adopt utmost caution when travelling within Russia. The rising hatred and stigmatisation of Central Asians among the Russian population could impact the migrant movement to Russia. This is already visible with tightened immigration rules, mass detentions, crackdowns and mass expulsions.16
With a large chunk of the Russian population already on the war front, the presence of migrants helps ease the workload on the domestic front in Russia. If migrants return to Central Asia, it would impact the domestic labour market in Russia. Therefore, the demand of manpower on the war front and domestic labour requirement could be affected heavily, which may lead Russia into an economic crisis due to shortage of labour.
Conclusion
The Islamic State’s claims of its involvement in the terror attacks in Moscow have shown that it has planned a long-term strategy against Russia. It sees Russia as a major obstacle in its attempts at globalising jihad. This has been evident given the fact that two of the Islamic State outlets—the ISKP and Islamic State Caucasus Vilayat—are concentrating on Russia as the adversary. This has been displayed by the group's displeasure with the Russian involvement in the West Asian theatre and also in the North Caucasus. The Islamic State continues to spread propaganda against Russia as part of its strategy.
The attack may impact the labour flow of Central Asian migrants into Russia. Secondly, Russian leadership could further strengthen its domestic security apparatus and focus on the Islamic State more aggressively. Russia’s tryst with terrorism in the past, particularly at the domestic level, has shown that it takes a strong stance on terrorism. This could revive a more aggressive Russian effort to counter terrorism at the domestic and regional levels. This may result in tightened border controls, which may impact its relationship with Central Asian countries.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
- 1. “Mapping Militant Organizations. ‘The Islamic State’", Stanford University, April 2021.
- 2. Jean Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, Policy Press, 2005.
- 3. “Al-Qaeda-Linked Group Claims Russians' Abduction”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 19 June 2006.
- 4. Lucas Webber, Peter Smith and Colin P. Clarke, “Moscow Attack Signals Broadening Footprint of ISKP’s Central Asia Contingent”, EurasiaNet, 29 March 2024.
- 5. Peter Smith, Lucas Webber and Colin P. Clarke, “Islamic State Escalates Anti-Russian Militant Campaign”, The Diplomat, 2 April 2024.
- 6. Ibid.
- 7. Lucas Webber, “Islamic State Celebrates Mutual Destruction in Russia-Ukraine War”, Militant Wire, 8 August 2022.
- 8. Briefing by Russian Foreign Ministry, Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, “Investigation into Terrorist Attack in Kabul”, The Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of India, 8 September 2022.
- 9. “Russian Security Agency Says It Foiled Attack on Moscow Synagogue by Islamic State Members”, Tass News Agency, 7 March 2024.
- 10. Sergey Markedonov, “ISIS: A Threat to the Greater Caucasus”, Russian International Affairs Council, 9 November 2015.
- 11. “Russia Says 6 IS Fighters Killed in Caucasus Republic”, Moscow Times, 3 March 2024.
- 12. “ISIS-K’s Sworn Enemy What Does the Islamic State Branch Claiming Responsibility for the Moscow Terrorist Attack Have Against Russia?”, Meduza, 25 March 2024.
- 13. Lucas Webber, “The Islamic State’s Anti-Russia Propaganda Campaign and Criticism of Taliban-Russian Relations”, The Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor,14 January 2022.
- 14. “Islamic State Khurasan Province Threatens Uzbekistan, Central Asia, and Neighbouring Countries”, Special Eurasia, 5 May 2022.
- 15. Paul Goble, “Influx of Russians Fleeing Mobilization Increasingly Alienating Central Asians”, The Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 11 October 2022.
- 16. Ayzirek Imanaliyeva and Vladislav Sorvyonkov, “Anti-migration Wave Hits Central Asian Guest Workers Following Moscow Terrorism Attack”, EurasiaNet, 11 April 2024.
Since the Camp David agreement of September 1978 and Egypt–Israel peace treaty of March 1979, arms flows into West Asia have been stepped up and new alignment of forces has taken place. Thus, the US has gained in influence over Egypt and this, in turn, has released new forces in the region. The Soviets too have attempted to make effective use of the developing relationship between Egypt and the United States to enlarge their own influence in the area. These developments have divided the Arab world into moderate anti-Camp David States led by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan; hardline anti-Camp David States or steadfastness and confrontation front that includes Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and the Camp David signatories: Egypt, Israel and the United States. While the moderate Arab States have tended to soften their stance, the hardliners have come out openly seeking Soviet military and political support. Meanwhile, the Camp David signatories, especially Egypt and the United States, have advanced towards a tacit alliance.
Debates around the existence of a strategic culture in India have tickled the minds of scholars in International Relations for a long time, with a critical precedent set by George K. Tanham (1992), through Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, written for the RAND Corporation. Tanham refers to the incoherence in India’s strategic behaviour and concludes that strategic thought is by far absent in India. Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Strategic Cultural Roots of India’s Contemporary Statecraft by Kajari Kamal puts an end to all these debates. The book paints a detailed picture of the strong influence of Kautilya’s thought on the core values displayed in India’s contemporary strategic behaviour through individual and collective decision-making at the leadership level (p. xviii).
Since the Hamas’s cross-border attack in Southern Israel on 7 October and Israel’s severe military response in Gaza, Iran has been central to both public and policy discussions about the potential expansion of the conflict into a wider regional war. Given that Iran-backed Lebanese Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen were quick to target Israel’s northern and southern borders, respectively, Tehran’s regional ‘proxy network’ has dominated discussions about the possibilities of conflict escalating into a direct war involving the US, Israel and Iran. Further, a series of missile and drone strikes by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against targets in Iraq, Syria and Pakistan in the aftermath of the ISIS-claimed terrorist attacks inside Iran, have once again focussed international attention on Iran’s sophisticated military capabilities and willingness to escalate.
This article explores the intricacies of the Riyadh- Abu Dhabi alliance in Yemen and the potential impact this has had on the conflict. Specifically, it adopts the theoretical framework of Intra-alliance politics, which integrates considerations of individual and collective interests in coalition, and examines how divergent interests and strategic preferences between the two major regional actors shape the dynamics of the alliance and evolving competitions within it. Further, it also assesses the implications of the discord between the two regional powers on Yemen’s stability. The article concludes that beyond distinct national interests, the inability to achieve the coalition’s primary objective of reinstating the government in Sana’a has further fuelled this divergence. While the coalition has undergone a transformation, the situation does not spell the end of the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi alliance, as they have been able to, in many instances, compartmentalize their disagreements for larger gains. Nevertheless, an increasing divergence between these two States in their Yemen policy is likely to be counter-productive to their shared goal of stabilizing Yemen.
This article argues for the rethinking of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and calls for reforms in the wake of APSA’s 20th anniversary since its adoption. The article proposes the adoption of an APSA PLUS approach to allow for structured cooperation with other States and non-State actors beyond the African continent, as well as the expansion of the number and scope of the existing pillars from the current five to six. The findings of this article are intended to offer recommendations on key areas that could benefit from such efforts.
The article introduces ‘DIY warfare’, a paradigm where soldiers utilize advanced commercial technologies with support from private tech firms, and civilians contribute technologically, often near conflict zones. This convergence blurs traditional combatant-non-combatant lines, challenging existing warfare doctrines. Employing a ‘3Cs’ analytical framework—compute, compatibility, and collaboration—it explores the shift towards a decentralized, technology-driven conflict, highlighting the potential for increased operational flexibility alongside the complexities of civilian-military integration and reliance on private entities. This article suggests DIY warfare could significantly alter military engagement at the tactical level in the digital era.
